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uNDERSTgNDING MISUNDERSTANDING: A PROPOSAL FOR AN 
. • 
EXPLANATION OF READING CHOICES * 
D~ETMAR ZAEFFERER 
This paper argues that the analysis of the phenomenon ~,f misunderstanding presents a fruit- 
ful contribution to the development of a theory of linguistic understanding. It tries first o 
claxtfy ,~te c ntral ,~otion and pxoposes a r ther detailed classification of different ypes of mis- 
unde~t~dtng. Then it develops, with the aid of decision analysis, a ge~teral frame for explain- 
ing those choices in theprocess of interpretation which are left open by the grammar. A sample 
misunde~tanding s pre~ented, informally discussed, and a proposal is made of how to supple- 
ment the grammar of speech acts in order to to represent the data adequately. Finally, an 
explanation of the sample c~.~e is given in terms of dcchion analysis, and possible ways of 
generalizing the suggested ,.xplanatory scheme are outlined. 
O. Interest of  the subject 
The phenomenon of  linguistic .~ds~mderstac~di~tg has been given very little atten- 
t ion in linguistics thus far. i ,This is hard ",o understand, since in all sciences having 
to do with sysP, ms it. is a well-kno~a fact that ff one wants to get insight into how 
a system worgs, it is mote revealing to reg~d instances ofsraalt rnisftmcttons than 
examples of  perfe¢ t functioning. So it is the hypothesis of  this paper ~at  it is often 
usefu~ for a tin~is'~ analyzing the meaning of  a certain expression of some natural 
language to ask the following ~uestions: 
-What  are the ways in which an utterance of that expression may be ndsunder- 
stood? 
. 
* The present paper:deve!ope~d ,.outof a talk~ ven at the 9. Linguistisches Kolloquium. Biele- 
feid, ~figulst 272.30,1974 at.. d' publL~hed inWorking papers 6 (1976) of the InstitUt flit Phonetik 
und sprac1~iehe Kommiin-lkv.tiofi~der UniversiHt .Miinchen under the titl6"Untersuchungen zu 
einer-Th¢6~e:deisprachHche:~:Mi~-efst ~ndni~se:':..l ~ould like tO thank Dr, Wolfgan8 Spolm for 
givirig,iielpful 9omr~eh~i"6n c,.eni~l"mlpects of the.revised Vers~'0n and Hartrnut Haberland for a 
de~e.d cdtiq.ue.61" ~ first dr~ft .oC.it, .AH:remalriinger~ori ire.of Course m~/own. 
I: ~PI.,~!:;II~~:.~0.~. tit -Of. ~e~iu~e-i~~g. ~h e.~.0x.~ .(M e~er and M~/ier 1895; 
, Me~r  ~1908i. '-iBierw~h::I ~70; F~0/i,kin 119.7.3 an~l :.'s0m~ Of. t~e~orks cited 1here), but little 
at~n.ti~n .~'ii~n.i~ P~d ;im ~:~e~ept~ol~  erro~i~ e~.~iand,. i  M~ter ..1895:1:i 57"- i59;Me~inger. 
~ 19~': 1242~ t~! ;  B0~d~il~.~3)  i~ ;!i~ di~i. n6 t i .~! ig! . :~e p~e~!~g,  i i~ :  de~'mg errors 
• ' " "  ' . . . .  " " " .'. ," '::~ ,". • • " ~ : " " -  -. '"':',-:- ' :i,.::~ ' ,""~."~" '::, " -~  ' ,, " 
330 D. Zaefferer / Understandi~g misu~derstandtng 
-What  are the conditions a person interpreting such an utterance must meet in 
order to understand it correctly o~ to misunderstand it? 
Thus the sample analysis 1 shall give below is me,ant to shed some light, among 
other things, on the serious/unserious-distinctioa in ;~peech act theory. 
Since the title of this paper sounds rather ambitious, it may be useful to explain 
it a little before going on. I do not intend to give art e~Laustive answer to the ques- 
tion of how to understand any kind of misunderstanding, bu~ rather point out a 
way towards such an answer. Furthermore, ] shall restrict myself to the analysis of 
misunderstanding arising between people who speak the same language, i.e. having 
internalized the same grammar. 2 In order to accot~at for mist~iderstanding within 
the frame of one language, we have first to specify ~e .gramma~ in such a way that 
it may assign a given utterance several possible readings, and the n to indicate which 
one is chosen by the interpreter on a given occasion and why. Under the supposi- 
tioa that his reading is not the correct one, we have an instance of a misunder- 
standing. Therefore, abstracting from tile case of conflicting grammars, the task of 
understanding misunderstanding amounts to the problem of explaining the choices 
that are made between possible readings. 
In section I, i shall give an explication of the rheumatic notion first, and unfold 
the various types of misunderstanding that occur. Then I shall outline the main 
characteristics ,f a theory of linguistic understanding that may serve as a fr~Lme for 
the explanation of misunderstanding (section 2). Furthermore I will take an exam- 
pie of one of the types presented in section 1, analyze it, and reflect on a possible 
explanation (sc'ction 3). In section 4, the scheme developed in the second section 
will be used to give a precise explanation of the sample case. Finally, the require- 
ments for a corroboration of the basic assumptions are discussed and'possibly 
applications are envisaged. 
1. The notion of linguistic misunderstanding 
1.1. Explication o f  the notioe.: 
In the heading of this section, the adjective 'linguistic' is added to our central 
notion because I believe that it is important, in view of a possible cooperation of 
linguistics with other disciplines, to bear in rn~nd that the phenomenon of mis- 
understanding is not restricted to linguistic action alone. 3 Having said this, i feel 
2 The explanation of misunderslandi~igs due to different grammaxs i trivial: It consists just in 
this difference, and the only point to be explained is why this difference is not neticed by the 
audience. 
3 A good example of non-linguistic misunderstanding s described in the followh~g passage from 
Peter Handke's "Die Angst des To~aann~ beim Elfmet~r" ['The fear of the goel-keeper at the 
penalty']: "She was about to sit down at a place ~shere there was no chair and Block 
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nevertheless entitled to negl,~,ct the qualifier for the rest of the paper and to talk 
simply' of misunderstanding tMU). MU shares with corr~;ct understanding (CU) the 
featun, ~ that an attempt of understanding has reached some result, in contrast o 
mere nonunderstanding (NU), but it shares with the latter the feature that som.~,- 
thing goes wrong with communication. Let me first spectt~y rite sense in which i 
shall take the notion of correct understanding: 
A person ] (the interpreter)has  correct understanding" (with respect o language 
L) of .~ome sound event SE in context C if and only if there is some state of affairs 
SA (where SA is not the occurrence of SE) s~:lch that 
(1) SE has occurred, 
(2) C holds, 
(3) SA holds because SE counts in C as bflnging about SA (according to L), and 
(4) ] believes that (1), (2), and (3). 
In case SA is the state of affairs m which some person S (the speaker) has per- 
formed an illocutionary act 4 towards a person A (the addressee), we shall speak of 
a full understanding (FU) of the SE under comideration. Where this is not the case, 
e.g. the speaker or the addressee is unk~.own, or the pr,~positional content is 
known, but not the illocutionary force s or vice versa, we shall speak of partial 
understat, dfng (PU). 
We can now turn to our central notion: 
A person T has misunderstood or has an incorrect understanding (with respect o 
languar~,e L) of some sound event SE in co~text C if and only if there are states of 
exclaimed: 'Beware!', but she had only crouched and picked up a coin that had fallen under the 
table when she was counting the money.'" (P. 96 of the 1972 paperback edition (F~nkfurt/M: 
Suhrkamp), translation by D.Z.) Obviously Block misunderstands the women's lowering of her 
trunk by bending her knees and hips as her being about to sit down, whereas it was 'meant as' 
getting ready to clench. It wmdd be an interesting task for psychologists to investigate 
whether there is a systematic relation between misunderstanding action (i,e. incorrectly infer- 
ring from an observed belmvio:: the intention govemin8 i t )and  misperforming an intended 
action (i,e, erroneously doixt~ ,,;ometh~g different fiom ~vhat one intends to do). Meringer 
(1908) treats the latter under ! ae title "Verhandeln" and exe, mplifl~l it by the case of a man 
who in order to see what the temperature is looks at his watch. The =une holds for the relation 
between linguistic misunderstanding and linguistic misperforming (t~e latter term being used 
here as acover term for speech errors and other kinds of mis-encoding~. 
4 For a characterization f this ~otion of. Austin 1962 - Au.sfin coiffed the term - or $eafle 
1969. Note however that my notion of 'itlocutionaxy act' differs from Austin's in that its per- 
fotmance do~;s not involve the securLng of uptake. Austin's argument t.hat i did not warn my 
autt~n¢ e unless meaning and force o f  my iovt~tion a~c, understood, as convincing as it may be, 
seems to be ~alid 0;~ly for Cases like warning, but not e.g. for asking a question. I believe ihat it 
is more useful tO generalize on the b~iS of the latter paradigm (asking) than on that of the 
s As usual, I take an fllocutionary act to be a function of its proposition~ content (if there is 
any) and its i~locuti0nary force (cf; Searle 1969)~: 
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affairs SA, SA', C' sttch that 
(1) SE has occurred, 
(2) C holds, 
(3) SA holds because SE counts in C as bringing about SA (according to L), 
(4) | be~eves (i) that (1), 
(ii) that C' holds, 
(ifi) that SA' holds because SE counts in C' as bringing about SA' 
(according to L), and 
(5) SA is not the same as SA'. 
The critical clause here is, of course, the last one. It presupposes the po.';sibi!ity for 
a speech act to be performed without being correctly understood (in ,contrast o 
Austin's concept of the illocutionary act, of. footnote 4). Again we may distinguish 
between full and partial understanding: If I have only a partial tu~derstanding of an 
utterance, it may be an incorrect one in addition. 
According to our definition | need not be different from S: i~. is quite possible 
for a pen~on to misunderstand his own utterance. Tl-ds may be d~;e ither to wrong 
beliefs about the language he is using (if he knows only little Italtan, he may think, 
having jttst uttered "Fa caldo!" that he has stated that it is cold, whereas in fact he 
has stated that it is hot), or to his not noticing a misperformanc,: on his side. Note 
by the way that his kind of MU connected with misporforman,:e may happen to 
the addressee as well, so that he understands the speak~,~r witiio~,~.z correctly under- 
standing his utterance. Bierwisch (1970: 399f.) has pointed out that such 'good' 
MU's, as we may call them, occur rather frequently. 
Leaving aside wrong beliefs of i about L, it follows from o~tr definition that 
MU's arising within one language are due to a difference between C' and C, i.e. a 
wrong assessment of the context by |. Suppose,:lly this wrong a.~.,essment of C has 
often the form of inadequate expectancies concerning the speaker. 
1.2. Four levels of  understanding and a first classification 
Following the usual distinctions, we may split up the process leading t, ~ a full 
understanding into four steps. (I should perhaps emphasize here that the, ~ steps 
belong to a theoretical and therefore idealizing-reconstruction of this t,rocess. 
Psychological reality is surely far more complicated: T~.,:ere is evidence for tOl~vard 
as well as backward influencing between the four levels - of. Fry 1970.) The first 
step on this way to a final reading assigned to some sound event SE is the identifica- 
tion of the expression E of L, which SE is an utterance of. Since tile components of 
E are essentially phonemes, I shall call the first level we reach in the interpretation 
process the vhonological level. If the first step i'afls, we have no reading at all, i.e. 
sheer nonunderstanding. 
The next step towards full understanding is a~ identification of the meaningful 
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elements the phonologlca~ reading is composed of and a specification of the rela- 
tions that hold between them, i.e. the building up of a syntactic structur,e whic~ 
together with the phonological reading yields a syntactical reading, thus leading ~o 
the syntactical level. In th(; third step, each of the lexical elements of the syntactic~d 
reading is assigned a lexical entry or word meaning, ltj result is the semantb:al read- 
ing which is situated on the semantical level. It specifies the context-independent 
portions both of the propositional content and of the illocufionary force. In the 
fourth step, the elem~:nts of the semantical reading are related to the actual situation 
o~r context C and a final or pragmatical reading belor~ging to the situational level ",s 
built up. The pragmatical reading specifies agent, addressee, illocuti~nary force and 
ptropositional content of the illocutionary act.token in question. 
Equipped with this four-fold distinction, we are able to introduce a first classi- 
fication of MU's according to the level on which they bear. I shall call errors on the 
f'ust level misperceptions, contrasting them with the other cases where the first step 
is made correctly, but at least one of the others is not. The latter I will call misinter- 
pretations. 
1.3. Three times eight types of  misunderstanding 
The framework outlined so fat permits us to make two more distinctions. First, 
we may distinguish according to whether a mistake in one st,~p is connected with 
another mistake in a subsequt;nt s ep, and if so, in which one(s). For the sake of 
illustration, let us im~"':~', a restaurant with an aquarium as environment for an 
utterance which is correctly perceived as "Do you see the man eating fish over 
there7" Suppose in additi(,n that the correct reading amounts to something like 'A 
asked B whether he sees th¢~ shark in the aquarium' and an incorrect one to 'A asked 
B whether he sees the bald man at the next table'. Here we have a mistaken syn'tac- 
tical analysis ('man' modified by 'eating fish" instead of 'fish' modified by 'man 
eating'), which induces a ,atistaken semantical reading, which in turn has conse- 
quences for the situational reference, as the given readings how. (They assume that 
the only man in the indicated direction who eats fish is the bald man at the next 
table and the only anthropophagous fi h in the indicated direction is the ~ark  in 
the aquarium.) 
Second, it is probably useful to distinguish between 
(a) MU's affect.~ng the iUocutionary force alone, 
(b) MU's affecting the propositional content alone, and 
(c) MLPs affectin~ bath. 
The example was obviously of the second kind. 
Using the distinctions developed thus fro, we get a classification comprising 
3 X 8 theoretically possible types of MU: see table 1. 
According to ~this: cheme, Our restaurant example is a MU of type 4a. Note that 
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these types are developed only by combining the di,;tincti~m features presented thus 
far. Whether all of them maylactually occur depends partly on the way the used 
notions are made precise. This is an issue leading into the center of recent discus- 
sions co ucerning formal grammar and,speech act theor~q and on which I do not 
intend to take a stand in this paper •.Let me just say that supplementing a Mow 
tague-type grammar 6 with a theory of contexts (aspects of situations re!evant for 
communication) and a grammar of the illocutionary force-functional meaningful 
element~, seems to me the most promising strategy towards an explicit theory of 
lhtguistic ommunication. 
2. Outl ine of  a theory of  l inguistic understanding 
The theoretical framework I shall present in this section makes no claim to com- 
pleteness, and even less to being definitive. It is developed in order to account for 
the data of the example presented in the following section and also for as many 
related phenomena s possible. Furthermore , it should be compatible with the 
recent developments of linguistic theory, amenable to the means of investigation of 
empirical psychology, and to a reasonable degree formal, and explicit. 
In section 1.1 ,, i have explicated the notion of understmading some sound-event 
SE in terms of knowing who did what to whom when producing SE in the situation 
C. But wh¢:e doe:s this knowledge come from? How does one know? I think it is 
the search for an answer to this question that a theory of linguistic understanding 
should be concerned with. 
Let us return tO our person i, who is confronted with the data of the situation C 
and some sound ewmt SE likely to be an uttermace of a language L. In order to 
account for what hal?pens then, the following factors seem to be required: 
-- | 's knowledge of L (his internalized grammar), 
- ]'s beliefs regarding C, and 
- Ps wants. 
There is a quite precise discipline concerned with processes which are determined 
by wants arid beliefs, namely deci,~ion analysis, 7 and therefore I pro?ose to recon- 
struct ~the process leading to an understanding in terms of a decis~,on procedure 
determined by t'he factors listed ab0v¢. This may seem ~ little surprising, since 
reading choices a~e normally made spontaneously and not eLfter conscious deli~era- 
tions. But decision analysis app!ies tO Spontaneous choices as weft, if we interpret 
its assertions as fo l I0~: . I f  ] had reflected On his want~ and beliefs con-:eming possi- 
ble results and e~on¢, he wou!d have made just tha't choice he actual~.y madc with- 
. :  
i 
6 CL Montague 1974: chapters 6:-8~ . . . .  ' 
7 For a goo d introduction se~Rai f fa  i968. , ,  • .  : 
, . 
. • 7 . .  
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out reflecting. (i should perhaps pof~t out that the if-clause presupp~es full con- 
scioumess of ] regarding his actual ~:mts and beliefs, a condition which is~ot  
always met in spontaneous behavior.) Thus the empirical assumption of my pro- 
posal is that linguistic understanding is only partly determined by ]% grammar, a~d 
that the rest of his interpretation is determined by his actual (not neceuarily ccn- 
scious) preferences and suppositions. 
Level  
of i n ter -  
p re tat ion  






Number of  g rammat ica l ly  pOssible read ings  




ooQ Q I I  *~s  wQm o~a t~m o~Q 
PU T~'PU . r~ ' - -PU 
PU I -PU  / '~PU 
FU FU FU FU FU FU FU I~U FU 
Fig, 1, General scheme for rcading-choicedia~m~s. 
~ FU ~ 
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The analytical tool of decision analysis isthe decision flow diagram. Sinq:e we are 
concerned here With chci-~es among readingJb I shall speak of reading ch~oice dia- 
grams.: A reading choice 0iagram is a tree which repzesents number arid identity of 
possible:readings (according to ]'s grammar) by the form the tree takes, i's beliefs 
regarding C by the subjective probability val, ues he, assumes for the corre,:tness of 
each reading with respect to C, and ]'s wants by the different utility values he 
a~gnseach of thepossible outcomes (NU, correct and incorrect PU and FU). 
Before using such a diagramin order to e~iplain the sample case of MtJ presented 
in the next seclion, ! will indicate the form of po:~sible r ading choic~ diagrams by 
specifying a general scheme from which Y~hey can be derived. This scheme also takes 
the form of a tree: eL fig. 1. 
This tree contains four ~fferent kinds of nodes. The final nodes are. marked NU, 
PU, FU, which moans non-understanding, partial understanding, and full under- 
standing respectively. The squares indicate action forks, representing ehoict:s to be 
made by the interpreter, whereas the circle~L mark so-called chance forks, represent- 
ing choices that do not depend on the interpreter's wants. The white circle forks 
each stand for a pair of events: either the chosen reading turns out to be correct, or 
it turns out to be incorrect. The black circles stand for choices to be made by the 
grammar, or the linguistic competence of rite interpreter. They indicate number and 
content of the possible readings. 
If we now read the scheme tree from top to bottom, we meet first an action 
fork: I assume that it depends on ~he wants of a person whether he chooses, when 
perceiving a certain sound event SE, to 'pay attention to this event or not. The 
latter choice, which may be labeled 'ignoring', is indicated by the left branch and 
leads to non-understanding. The other branch indicates the elation for 'putting SE 
into one's grammar'. (The tree supposes that the interpreter understands just one 
language. If, however, he understand; two or more, he would also have to choose 
among different grammars, and the tr, m would have to be modified accordingly.) 
The leftmost branch of the foiler ing fork leads into.the colum~a marked by '0'. 
This stands for the event that SE has no phonological reading according to the 
grammar; i.e. SE cannot be interpreted as a realization of a possible sequence of 
phonemes. The result is a lso nonun,~ier.jtanding. The next branch stands for the 
event that the phon010gi'cal part of the grammar assigns SE just One phonological 
reading, and so on. Tile number of p~ssible branches i  left open b.ere, but it is sup- 
posedly limited by the capacity of th,,. lmman brain , which cannot differentiate the 
cases with more than a certaLq:number of readings from the case that there is no 
reading at all. 
The nex't line in the tree again show, s action forks. Let us look first at the one in 
.the Column marke.dbyl a '2'.at he t0P,.Here.tiie nterpreter's grammar hasassigned 
~e..soUnd even~t.-:in .q~estion:.tW6 ph0n0iogieally., possible, ieaemgs;..now it is up to 
tiaeinter Pr6,tei': to-.:Oh00se iambng. t~fii:~!:, i iii i the.~ex~iine;i~ete:, ~oliowbinary. e~han ce 
f0ri~ :whose. .~ranches..:-..~ePresenltie!0rre~faesL0i:i,in60rrectne~, iespectively,. of the 
.-chosen.:reading~. I f-f0rbotlal readinga ~ e~:~ iir0babilitgbf Lac0rreett~ess is too-high,, the 
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interpreter may decide to cho(x~e the third branch leading to NU. The choices in the~ 
other columns Inay now be understood analogically. 
The chanc~ forks in the next line 10ad again into different columns, in accur- 
dance with the number of readings that the syntactical part of the grammar assigns 
to each of the phonoI ogical readings from the phonological component. Note that 
fo~- the sake of perspicuity the tree does not only neglect cases v~ith more :hart 3 
possible readings. In order to complete it, we would also have to hang on e.qch of 
the black circle nodes above the syntactical level a subtree like the one under the 
le(tmost node. The same holds for the following levels. 
In order to get a reading choice diagram from our general scheme, we have to do 
fhree, things: First, we go to the topmost black circle fork, cut off all branches but 
one and cancel the node. Then we go down the chosen path to one o f  the following 
black circle forks, cut off all branches but one ~nd do the same with all black circle 
forks hanging from the same square fork, paying attention that the remaining 
branches correspond to each other, e.g. that it is always the second-from-the-left 
branch that is not cut m case the grammar selects just one reading. Then we cancel 
again all these nodes and so on. (This step is jus~.ified by the assumption that the 
choices a grammar makes are deterministic in the sens~ that it assigns at each level 
one of its outcomes (indicating number and identity of possible readings) the 
probability value 1 .) Second, we assign each branch of the remaining chance forks a 
probability value so that they- add up to l for each fork. Third, we assign each final 
node a pay-off value. 
The first step will depen~ on the grammar, the second one on the beliefs of the 
interpreter, the third one on his wants, t],ut now let us look at a concrete xample. 
3. A sample analysis 
Suppose we are given d~e foLlowing data: 
B, a schoolboy, and A, his gnmdfather, whom B is visiting, are walking through 
the zoo. They see an ape and ~ hippopotamus nursing their young and B expres- 
ses his amazement abou*t he diversity of mammals. This gives rise to the follow- 
ing dialogue: 
A (1) There are even fishes that nurse their young. 
B (2) You're kidding me! 
A (3) No. 
(4) Why? 
B (5) Fishes aren't mammals. 
A (6) But of course, dolphins for instance, s
8 The example was inspired by a remark by Dieter Wur~dedich (1971:: 153)conceTning the fact 
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Thecritical Uttet~irtCe is that of (1), made bY A in the given situation. The fol- 
lowi~t~, dialogue:indicates that, and how it has been understood by B, as well as part 
o f:'..~,e reas0n " thai: B understands it just this way. Let us suppose that A and B were 
both ,,i~cere When Uttering (2), (3), (5), and (6) and that A didn't make an error 
wh, m ~'ttering(i), so that the correct reading of (1) coincides with what A meant 
Wh~,.n uttering (1), 
Then \re tall'state that the outcome ofB's interpre~tation f A's utterance of (1) 
is a readin~ which implies that by uttering (1) A teas kidding B, while the correct 
reading implies that A was no't. Our definition of MU applies: B's understanding of
the sound event representing the utterance under consideration was a misunder- 
standing. Before we cart try to give an explanation of this event in terms of B's 
wants and believes, We have to investigate a little further. 
The first question to be answered is: what exactly are the readings we are con- 
cerned with? A ¢¢:,rreet reading I shall call c-r,~ading; an u-reading is tht~ reading as it 
was actually under~'tood. This entails another question:What is kidding? As a first 
step towards an ans~,er, it seems acceptable to state that kidding is not the same as 
lying, but thal~, like lying, it is a kind of deceiving. Since we have not d!.*.cu~ed 
deceptive speech acts y~.t, let me point out that according to our notion of correct 
understanding, the c.rea<~ng says what a person reaily did. Therefore, whenever a
. 9 ~  r -  person tries to deee,.o, ~he correct reading dif?ers from the one he wi.~es his 
addreszee to active at. The ktter  reading I shall call intended or i-reading. 9 Thus; the 
difference between deeep'tiw' and non-deeoptive ,,tpeeeh acts may be char~eteriT_ed 
by the differer~ee or identity, t~speetively, betwee~a e.reading and i-reading. Accord- 
hag to our conceptual framework, the i-reading of a deceptive speech act is taste out- 
come of an intended MU. to This will do as to the eommon denominator of kidding 
and lying. 
The difference between the two can be e~tplained in terms of the common 
denominator of kidding and joking, namely tuaseriousness. While an ordinat.v 
sincere assertion attd a lie are both sen,~us things, joking and kidding are not. But 
whereas the unseriousness of a joke is evident, the point of kidding lies in the 
chances that the addressee will not detect he uns:eriousness. If he deteets it, he is 
that the classification Of sentences Like (7): 
(7) The whaleis a mammal 
• , 
as anr ~yticali con~radictox'y, o g. synthetical depends on Oie way the lexleal entry for 'whale ~ is 
fozmulated, •, 
~9 l~a~ indebted t6~ Wolfgang Gessner (Hamburg) for dnLw~ng my attention to the interesting 
ires lications a'systematic analysisof deceptive speech aots has for the theory. 
l°'Uhe intendedMu has to.bedisting~ishcd from theintenticn,d MU, where the interpreter did 
get-the 'correct: reading, bui.make$ as ~ he:got anothex pos'.db[c L'ne. Bar.Hiliel's cxample of the
leave class- :"sCh,~!~":~y is sueh:~a:"~-/The.-t~ii¢~ti~r.:.teUS.~:him::!'.Ei~he',e yc,u s~t. up or,. you the 
-" r~m!.., and tlie puPil".uh~le~~ds.:Ve~. :well-that this iS."an.ordet tobequiet, but he replies: 
tq ,  ' ' ' ~ '¢ -  " " ' ' ' ' " ' " - " " " " ' "  : " ~ : '¢  ' ' s ~  " '  , " Then ~ prefer to leave the c!as~oom. 
• . ~ . .  . " . . -  • ,. ~ '  , 
• . , • , 
• , . , 
• 
, 
. .  , . , , ~ . • 
, , . ,  - .  • , ~ . 
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the winner of this small ~me;  if not, that is, if he believes v,haI: the other s~id, then 
'.he gain fo~ the speaker wiU be the higher, the b~tter he can shc~w.that theaddressee 
should have be~.~n able to detect the unseriousne~. And in contrast o a lie, where 
an avowal of t~e deceptive intention is explainable only by some change of mind, it 
seems that it belongs to the very notion of kidding to undeceive the 'victim', 11 
Now we have four subcategories of assertions. The serious ones, comprising the 
sincere und insincere assertions, and the unserious ones, comprising those that ~:tre 
overtly so (jokes etc.), and those that are covertly so (.Ikidding). Our data tell us that 
the c-reading was not of the last kind; let us suppose in addition that it w0s of the 
first kind. 
It remains to find out the point of origin of our sample MU. The utterances c,f 
(5) and (6) of our data indicate where to look for :;t" Let us assume that indeed the 
notion of 'fish" A had in mind when uttering (1) is different from the one involved 
in B', u.reading of that utterance, the former bering characteri~'d by Tinned anim:~l 
living in the water' and the latter by 'cold-blooded gill-breathing vertebrate living in 
(, l-  ,,~e wa~er'. The latter notion is today the commonly accepted one, but the other, 
pre~cientific one is not entirely out of use yet. 
Now we can sketch the idea for an explan~tion of our s~mple MU: B, more 
familiar wi~ the modern use of "0sh' than with the older one, interprets the propo- 
sition expressed by A's utterance of (1) in a way which makes it contradict his 
belief that there are no cold-blooded gill-breathing animals that nurse their young. 
Since he believes that A shares this belief, he has to assume that ,~ is either insincere 
or unserious. He chooses the second possibility m~d, excluding overt unseriousness, 
arrives at the ~-reading iven above. Let us see whether t!~s sketch can be made 
precise in a reading-choice diagram, ndwhether additional datz or assumptions will 
be required. 
4. Explaining the samp]!e c~ 
When proposing, in the begbmJng of section 2, decision analysis as an analytic 
tool for our purposes, I said that this discipline is concerned with processes deter- 
rained by wants and beliefs. Before goi~lg on, i feel that I sho~ld explicate a little 
my conception of the way decision m'.dysis may help us i~l o~r attempt o arrive at 
~: }inguisfic understanding of misunderstanding. Sh~ce decision an~)lysis a theory 
of any iadi~dual behavior which is de~ermined by wants and beliefs, it can be 
apptied not only to the problem of answering the question 'What sh~dl I do?', posed 
by some person who reflects about some decision to be made (though it has been 
developed to that purpose), but '~dso to answering the question~ 'What will he do?' 
). I This holds for the two-person-game. The~e is a ehree-~.Id-more-perscns-~.~riant of this game, 
where the direct addressee n~d not be undeceived, pro~ided thzt th~ audience look 'through 
the game. 
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and "Why did he do that?'. Given a person's wants and beliefs, decision analysis 
helps us to predict .~ome of his future behavior and given some of ~ais past behavior, 
wants ~nd beliefs, Jit te~ls us whether the latter two are suff~ciet~t to explain the 
former one (he did X because he believed that p and wanted q). And if we can 
explain lnisunderstanding, I think we have an understanding of mist:nderstanding. 
We could do that in principle also without decision analysis, but its', application 
forces us te make all assumptiotas explicit that enter into the analys~s. 
The informal analysi~ in the preceding section has shown our sam.~ie MU to be 
an instance of type 2e of the classification developed in section I. 'We can now use 
the general scl~eme give=n in section 2 and draw a reading choice diagram for B's 
reading of A's utterance of (1): see fig. 2. 
If you compare the general scheme given in section 2 and ~ur instruction3 for 
deriving reading choice diagrams, you will see that in fig. 2 the subtrees bantling 
from the branches which indicate thal the phonological and syntactical analys;s, 
turn out to l~,e incorrect (id and ie, respectively) are omitted. This will be justifier2 
below (see f¢,otnote 13). Further you can see that the following data of our anal- 
ysis are reflected in t~-e structure of the reading-choice diagram' B's grammar 
assigns the g~ven sound event e.,actly one phonological and one syntactical readiog, 
but it allows t'~,o different semantical readings and for each of them four diffe~ent 
pragmatical in~erpretations. Reading a makes use of the preseientific notion of 't~sh' 
while readin:~ b comes from the modern notion. The ~terpretati.~ns s, i, a, and c 
(for sincere, insincere, overtly and covertly rnserious) are those permitted by the 
grammar for propositions expressed in the declarative mood, provided they are not 
a special sort (e.g. involve some future behavior of the addressee). 
Our data .'.ell us that B actually chose b and c, i.e. that he interpreted the so'and 
,~,znt produced by A as a covertly unserious assertion of A towards B, that there 
even exis~L cer'tain cold-blooded gill-breathing vertebrates which nurse their yoking. 
How can we explain tha.t? We can represent our information that B thought of the 
modern notion of 'fish' rather than of the prescientific one by saying that B 
believed in a vet-;," !~jgla probability for a to be the incorrec~t readin'g and for b to be 
the correct one. We therefore assign the branches ia and :b the v:due 0.9, ~nd cor- 
respondingly 0.t to ca and lb. But what about the pragmatical choices? Pro~qded a 
normal relation between grandfather and grandson holds, we may assume, that con- 
eerning a normal, declaratively exprezsed proposition B ~ ~,lieves a rather high prob- 
ability to hold for the ~'mcere assertion case, against a rather low one for the other 
cases; let us say 0.7 for s, 0.1 for i, 0.2 fi~r o and 0 for c, But this holds only in the 
absence of eount~,'revidenee, as in the a.ease, in the b.ease, there is .~ome counter- 
evident(; The d~ta suggest strongly that B assumes A to know that cold-blooded 
gill-bre~ith~g ~tnimals arel.not mammals and hence that there aren't an~ of tl~em 
which nurse their young.  But from the i~terpretation that A sincerely asserts the 
contrary, it would foUow that A bdieves to be true what he kJ~ows to be false, ,'rod 
this is impossible; ,l"lacr(~'fore, in the b-case we can assign the probability 0 to the 
event that the Is-interpretati0n, is correct. Supposing that, aeeordh,.g to our analysis 
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Fig. 2. Reading-choice diagram for B's interpretatio~ of A's utterance of (i ~. 
Legend: 
A: Action fork of  choosing between ignoring the ~ound event SE produced by A and paying 
attention to it. 
B: Action fork of choosing between the only grammatically possible phonologicaI reading d 
of SE and non-understanding. 
C: Action fork of choosing be.tw~:en the only grammatically possible syntactical interpretaticn 
e of the phonological read,ing and PU. 
D' Action fork of  choo.qing lbetwt',en the two grammatically possible semantical interpretations 
a and b of the syntactical reading and partial understanding (PU). 
E, F: Action forks of choosi'rag between the four grammatically possible pragmatical interpreta.. 
tions s, i, o, c of the sema.atieal reading a and PU. 
G, H: Action forks of  choosing between the four grammatically possible pragmatical interpre~ 
rations s,/, o, c of  the semantit~al reading b and PU. 
d: Phonological interpretation of SE. 
e: Syntactical interpretation of SZF.. 
a, b: Semantical interpretatic,n saying that the syntactical reading under consideration expresses 
in the declarative mood P l (in the a-case), P2 (in the b-ease), respectively, where pl is the 
proposition that there exist even some finned animals living in the water which nurse their 
yoang, and P2 is the pr, oposition that there exist even some cold-blooded giU-breathinl, 
vertebrates which nurse their young. 
s, i, o, c: Pragmatical interprc:tations saying that the semantical reading in question constituted 
the iUocutionary act that A asserted to B sincerely (s), insincerely (i), with overt unserious- 
ness (o), with covert unsedou:;ness (c), that p I, respectively P2, holds in the actual world. 
"ee? (e~e {~ , e, a, b, s, i, o, c})" a turns out to be correct. 
ri~" (ae {d, e, a, b, s, i, o, c})" ~ turns out to be incorrect. 
of kidding, the probability for the c..interpretation becomes rather high in that case, 
while the proportion between the other two cases remains constant, we get the 
probability values for s, i, o, c as the correct readings to be O, 0 .1 ,0 .2 ,  0.7, respec- 
tively. 
But even given all this, we cannot get the result of  our analysis yet, since we still 
lack ~ome important data. Thus far, we have only considered B's glammar and B's 
beliefs, not his wants. Here we can assume that B actually wants to get an entirely 
correc~ and fltll understanding, and that he prefers this over an entirely correct 
partial understanding:, and the latter in turn over non-understanding. Further it 
seems reasonable to assume that for B non-tmderstanding is better than misunder- 
standing, and to reconstruct his preference-ltierarehy for the latter case in approx- 
imately the following way: ineor=.ect p~tial  ~anderstanding 1". is better than par- 
tially incorrect full un,~lerstanding, and tlae l~tter is p::eferre:t ow;r a totally incorrect 
ftdl understanding. Ilae.,e assumptions are rende,ed by the pay-off matrix in 
table 2. 
Now you can understand the numbers assigned to the final nodes of  the tree in 
fig. 2, and now we have all the necessary data for getting an answer to the question 
12 Here i am not  quite sure about  the c ~'dering o f  th~ sub-cases. 
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Table 2 
A~umed CVU payoff matri× for B. 
0 I 2 3 4 
. . . .  
0.5 -0.1 - - - 
1 -O .2  -0 .4  - - 
2 -0 .4  --0.6 -0 .8  - 
4 -1 - -2  -3  -4  
Legend: 
a: Level achieved in the interpretation process. 
a = 1 : Phonological level 
a = 2: Syntactical level 
a = 3: Semantical level 
a ~ 4: Situt~tional (final) level 
b: Degree of incorrectness, i.e. number of levels on which i1,.correct int,~rpretations are m~de. 
U~: Full understanding (FU) 
U~:  Entirely correct full understanding 
U3: Entirely correct partial understanding on the semantical level (PU) 
U~ Co ¢ 0)" Misunderstanding! (wider sense) 
U~ Co ¢ 0)" Misunderstandin~ (narrower sense)J (MU) 
CV. Communication Value 
CVU: Communication Value Unit 
Example: CV(U 2) - 1 CVU, or: the communication value of an entirely correct partial under- 
standing on the syn~acticaI level is 1 Communication Value Unit. 
which reading choices B will make under the given circumstances (w~ have to 
pretend for a moment hat we still don't know Iris choices). The answer will be ob- 
tained by means of a so-called averaging-out-and-folding-back procedure~ which 
runs as follows: We start from the right and ,:ompute for each chance fork its 
expected communication value (ECV), which is obtained by adding the ploducts of 
• e probal~ility value and the pay-off value for each branch (averaging ou0. l~-~en 
we take the maximum ECV, copy it on to the next action fork and 'block' all 
branches leading to chance forks with smaller ECV by double strokes (folding 
back). The procedure :Is repeated with the copied ECV's as input until the leftmost 
action fork is reached. 13 Those paths that are not blocked by double-strokes indi~ 
cate the choices out- a~nt  makes. In our case he, chooses b and c, just as indicated 
in the data. ~4 We can say that the presumptive xplaining data we have gathered 
13 It is easy now to 8~ ~ the promised justification for our leaving ou~. of two subtrees: since 
their ECV is multiplied ~vith 0, the next ECV ecpJv~ls the one of the other action fork D an ~1 C, 
respectively. 
14 In case b ~rns  out t~ be incm~ect~ the diag~m predicts a PU-chotce by IL 
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ar,~ sufficient for an explanation of the data to be accounted for, namely B's choice. 
Perhaps other data can do this as well, but I think that the assumptions made in tk~s 
explanation have at least a fair degree of plausibility. 
In order to  go beyond mere plausibility, we would llave to analyze quite a 
number of further sample cases, develop empirical tests for the probability assigr- 
ments and the pay-off ' ' t s matrix, and last but not least, develop grammox in a way 
that enables it to play its central role in our explanatory scheme. I hope my s~ab- 
classification of assertions has contributed a little to this purpose. But a lot of work 
remains to be done. 
5. Conclusion 
I have attempted to show, by giving an example, how tryit~g to explain linguil~tic 
misunderstanding may be a usef~fl viewpoint in analyzing finguistic phenomena, vad 
how it may contribute to the development of a theory of linguistic understanding. 
1 s 1 am indebted to Hartmut Haberland for reporting: to me a real life example, where the c ata 
cannot be accounted for unless one changes the assumed pay-off mf trix a little. The situation is 
in a tobacco shop, the dialogue it; in Gerraan: 
A (1) Ich h/itt gem Pfeifenreiniger. 
B (2) M~Achten Sie diese konischen ...? 
A (3) Ich will koine komischen, ich will ganz gew~hlfliche. 
The critical utterance is that of (2) with the v-reading 'B asks A whethe," he wants those conical 
pipe cleaners" and the u-reading 'B asks A whether he wants those ~trange ("komischen") pipe 
cleaners'. This is "a misperceF:io~, of the 7a-type. We know furthermore that the acoustic data 
for A are so that he assigns to each of the possible phonological readings of SE (containing/m/ 
or/nl ,  respectively) the subjef.tAw • .probability 0.5, and that the situation C' (the context as •een 
by A) is so that the c-reading is 'far away' ('.probability value: 0.1) and the u-reading is still un- 
expt,~cted (less than 0.5), but has a much higher probability, say 0.4. if we assume now for A 
the pay-off matrix given in table 2, the reading choice diagram predicts that A bases his s-0 bse- 
quent behavior on the assumption '~hat he ha.~ only a partial understanding of SE. ]~u~ this i, ob- 
viously not the case, since with c~nly partial under~tanding people normally check back. The 
correct prediction is made, if we assume that for A, correct partial understanding is of much 
smaller communicational value than supposed in table 2, ~nd that his pay-off matrix looks e.g. 
as follows: 
CU MU1 MU2 MU3 MU4 (de~ee of incorrectness) 
NU 0 . . . .  
PU (phon.) 0.2~ -0.1 . . . .  
PU (synt.)  0.5 -0 .2  -0 .4  - -- 
PU (sem.) 0.75 -0 .4  -0 .6  -0 .8  - 
FU 4 -1  -2  -3  -4  
'Fhis is ~' an empirical hypothes~ w~hich mightbe corroborated or disconf'mned by appropriate 
tests. 
3,i6 D. Zaefj'eree / Understanding mg¢understanding 
The purpese of  this paper will be fulfi l led if one or another  o f  my coll.e.agues will 
feel ~,timulated to adopt  this v iewpoint  in some work  he/she is carryir~g out .  Maybe 
this way linguistie,~ - in cooperat ion  wi th  psychology and soc io logy-  will be able 
to contr ibute  som,;day in a reasonable and wel l - founded way to the enainently im- 
port 'mr practical task of  analyzing and dissolving those eommunieat iona l  distur- 
bances that are due to misunderstanding,  i believe ~t is wor thwhi le  to thh,.k about  
the problem of  how xrdsunderstanding can be understood.  
References 
Austin, John L. 1962. How to do things wzlh words. Oxford: Oxford University Pres~, 
Bier~visch, Manfred. 1970. Fdllerlinguistik. Linguistic inquiry 1 : 397-414. 
Bond, Z.S. '=973. Perceptual errors in ordinary speech. Zeitschrift fiir Phone',ik, Sprachwissen- 
schaft und Kommunikat~onsftJrschung 26:691 -695. 
Fcomkin, Victoria A., ed. 1973. Speech errors as |~nguistic evidence. The Hague: Mouten. 
Fry, D.B. 1976'. 'Spe.ech reception and perception'. In: J,)hn Lyons, ed., New horizon~ in ~,in- 
guistics. Harmondsworth : Penquin. 
Mcringer, R, 1908. Aus dem Leben der Sprache: Vcrsptechen, Kindersprache, Nachahmungs- 
|rieb. Berliu: Bchr. 
Meringer, R. and K, Maier. [895. Versprechen und Verle.qen: Eh~e psychologis~h4inguistisch¢ 
Studie. Stuttgart: G6schen. 
~,!ontagu¢, Richard. 1974. ]:orma! philo.~..~phy. New ltaveqa etc.: Yale Uuivt:,rsity Press. 
~aiffa, ltowa~d, 1968. Decision analysis. Reading~ Mas~,: Addison-\Yesley. 
Searle, John R. 1969. Speech acts. Cambridge, England: ('ambridge Universily Prt'xq 
Wunderlich, Dieter. 1971. Pragmatik, Sprechsituation, DeLgis. Zeitschrift ftir Ltteraturwissen- 
schaft und Hnguistik 1 : 153-190. 
Dietmar Z~eJferer 
Born 1947. After graduating from college: (subjects: ~erman and French) he taught at the Uni- 
versity of Munich and oallabo~ated in a pz'oject concerned with e development of pragmatic 
language ~flts in preschoolers. 
Presently he is working on a project sponsored by the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinsehaft" 
and headed by Professor Eikc yon Savigny, investigating the preferences and beliefs or, which 
the use of a certain ~anguage by a certain population depends. 
His scientific interests are focused on the pragmatic fgundations of fragments of natural 
langu ages as described by Montague-type grammars. 
lha bllcations 
1976. 'Z'ar sprachlichen Ha,~dlungsf~ihigkeit 4-6j/ihriger Kinder. Entwurf einer empirischen 
Llntersuchung'. In: G. Draehman, ed., Akten des 1. Salzbuzger Kolloquiums tiber Kinder- 
spraehe. Tiibingen: Narr. (With K. l.indner) 
1976. ~Questions and answezs in a context-dependent Montague grammar'. In: F. G~inthner and 
S.J. Schmidt, eds., ProceediJ';gs of the Bad Homburz~ Workghop on Formal Semantics, June 
1976 (forthcoming). (With R. Hausser) 
1977. 'Kindliehes .~prechhandeln in relev~aten Situationen. Ergcbnisse ciner ¢mpirischen U ter- 
suchung'. In: W.D. Bald and K. Spzenget, eds., Semantik und Pragmafik. Tilbingen: Ni¢- 
meyer. (With H.G. Fren_,) 
